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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20021053-CA

vs.
JEFFREY DON IRELAND,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
ie Je Je

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Does "consumption/' as that term is used in section 58-37-2(l)(dd)5 include the
"physiological metabolism of the substance" in the body?
Standard of Review. "The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law which
[this Court] review[s] for correctness, according no deference to the [trial court's] legal
conclusion." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, U 10, 992 P.2d 986.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann, g 58-37-2(l)(dd) (1998)
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control,
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application,
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group
possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or
user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have
individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if
it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more persons in the
use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the activity
was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place or under
circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over it.
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)q) (Supp. 1999)
(2) Prohibited acts B -Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter[.]
Utah Code Ann, g 76-l-201(l)(a) (1999)
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which
he commits,, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or
that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state;
* * *

(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct
which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such an element,
occurs within this state.
* * *

(5) The judge shall determine jurisdiction.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Facts
On November 3, 2001, defendant was the driver of a vehicle that collided with
another vehicle resulting in the death of Angel Garcia, the driver of the other car. R. 248: 67; Exh. I.1 Police requested permission to draw a blood sample, but defendant refused. R.
248: 43-44. Police secured a search warrant and, more than five hours after the accident,
obtained a blood sample from defendant. R. 248:24, 54. Defendant also volunteered a urine
sample at the jail. R. 248:25-26. Testing of the blood revealed a methamphetamine level of
.10 micrograms per milliliter and a cannabis metabolite level of 6 nanograms per milliliter.
R. 248: 51; Exh. 3. The urinalysis confirmed the presence of both amphetamine and
cannabis metabolites. R. 248: 51-52; Exh. 3.
Summary of Proceedings
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine, a third degree
felony, and driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B
misdemeanor. 1 -3. He moved to suppress the blood and urine evidence, but that motion was
denied. R. 59-61,201-05,248. The State moved for apretrial ruling on jurisdiction, arguing
that the presence of methamphetamine metabolites in defendant's bloodstream established
his continued "consumption" of the drug within the State. 83-87. The trial court agreed,

1

A copy of the Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant was admitted into evidence at
the suppression hearing as Defendant's Exhibit 1 and is included in Addendum A. Exhibits
introduced at the suppression hearing are found in the record in one of two manila envelopes.
3

concluding that "'consumption' includes defendant's physiological metabolism of the
substance, which was an ongoing process." R. 206-08.
Defendant thereafter pled guilty to both counts as charged, but reserved the right to
appeal the trial court's decisions finding jurisdiction and denying his motion to suppress. R.
169-76. The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years for
unlawful possession of methamphetamine and a concurrent jail term of 180 days for driving
with a measurable controlled substance in the body. R. 191-96. Defendant timely appealed.
R. 209, 226-28, 245-47.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The presence of methamphetamine in defendant's blood was sufficient to establish
that defendant was "at least partly" using or consuming methamphetamine "within Utah." R.
207. Section 58-37-2 defines use as "the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or
consumption . . . of controlled substances." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) 1998).
Because "the application, inhalation, swallowing, [or] injection" of a controlled substance
exhausts the list of ways that a controlled substance can be introduced into the body,
interpreting consumption as "the initial act of introducing a controlled substance into the
body" as urged by defendant, Aplt. Brf. at 20-21, would render that term meaningless and
insignificant.

As a result, "consumption" should be interpreted as including the

physiological metabolism of a substance, as found by the trial court.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
"CONSUMPTION"
INCLUDES
THE
PHYSIOLOGICAL
METABOLISM OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY2
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1999), the State has jurisdiction to prosecute an
offense that "is committed either wholly or partly within [Utah]." In this case, defendant
was charged with violating Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(Supp. 1999), which makes it
unlawful to "knowingly and intentionally [ ] possess or use [methamphetamine]." In this
case, the only evidence of defendant's possession or use of methamphetamine in Utah was a
positive drug test of defendant's blood and urine. See R. 248: 51-52; Exh. 3.
In finding jurisdiction, the trial court observed that possession or use is "broadly
defined" to include, among other things, the "'consumption'" of a controlled substance. R.
207 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd)(1998)). The trial court rejected defendant's
argument that consumption is limited to the "physical act of introducing [a] controlled
substance into your body."

R. 248: 118, 121-22.

Instead, the court interpreted

"consumption" as including a "defendant's physiological metabolism of the substance,
which [is] an ongoing process." R. 207; R. 248: 121-22. Where defendant's blood tested
positive in Utah for methamphetamine, the court concluded that the "process [of
consumption of the controlled substance] occurred at least partly within Utah." R. 207. The

Because the trial court did not find jurisdiction under a theory that the presence of
methamphetamine in defendant's blood supported an inference that he introduced
methamphetamine into his body while in Utah, the State does not address defendant's
argument in point A.
5

court thus determined that "the State need not prove where defendant ingested the
methamphetamine." R. 207.
At issue on appeal is whether "consumption," as that term is used in section 58-372(l)(dd), includes the "physiological metabolism of the substance" in the body, as decided
by the trial court, see R. 207, or is limited to "the initial act of introducing a substance into
the body," as defendant contends on appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. A review of the law reveals
that the trial court correctly concluded that "consumption" includes the physiological
metabolism of the substance in the body.
A.

RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

"The plain language of [a] statute provides . . . the road map to the statute's meaning,
helping to clarify the intent and purpose behind its enactment." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT
123, ^f 52,63 P.3d 621. This Court "presume[s] that the legislature used each term advisedly
and give[s] effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Nelson v.
Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, the Court reads the statutory
language so as "'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful'" and "'avoid[s]
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" Maestas,
2002 UT 123, \ 52 (emphasis and first brackets supplied in Maestas) (citations omitted). As
explained by the Utah Supreme Court, "'effect must be given, if possible, to every word,
clause and sentence of a statute'" and "[n]o clause[,] sentence or word shall be construed as
superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction can be found which will give force to
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and preserve all the words of the statute.'" Id. (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2 A Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 46:06 (4th ed. 1984)) (emphasis added).
B.

A NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF "CONSUMPTION" RENDERS IT
SUPERFLUOUS AND MEANINGLESS

Defendant acknowledges the foregoing rules of statutory construction. See Aplt. Brf.
at 13. However, his proposed definition of "consumption" as "the initial act of introducing a
substance into the body," Aplt. Brf. at 20-21, renders other portions of the section
meaningless or superfluous and insignificant, contrary to the rules of statutory construction.
Defendant contends that the meaning of "consumption" as "the initial act of
introducing a substance into the body" is supported when "viewed in context with the other
descriptive words surrounding it." Aplt. Brf. at 14. Section 58-37-2 defines "possession" or
"use" as follows:
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control,
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application,
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group
possession or use of controlled substances....
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1 )(dd) (1998). While "possession" is thus understood as "the
joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, retaining, belonging, [or] maintaining
. . . of controlled substances," "use" is understood as "the application, inhalation,
swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . of controlled substances." Id. (emphasis added).
The State agrees with defendant that the terms "application," "inhalation,"
"swallowing," and "injection" each "describe [an] act of introducing a substance into the
body." Aplt. Brf. at 15; see also R. 248: 118. "Application" is the act of "placfing] in
7

contact/' as in "applying] an antiseptic to a cut," Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 105
(1993); "inhalation" is the act of "draw[ing] in by breathing," Webster's at 1163, as in
smoking or snorting; "swallowing" is the act of "tak[ing] in through the mouth as food,"
Webster's at 717; and "injection" is "the act.. . of injecting a drug or other substance into
the body," Webster's at 1164. These terms, however, exhaust the list of ways in which a
controlled substance is introduced into the body.
If, as urged by defendant, "consumption" is interpreted as "the initial act of
introducing a substance into the body," Aplt. Brf. at 20, it renders the surrounding terms
"'superfluous, void or insignificant,'" or becomes so itself. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, <|[ 52
(quoting Norman J. Singer at § 46:06). Thus, consistent with the rules of statutory
construction, "consumption" must mean something other than thermere introduction of a
substance into the body.
C.

"CONSUMPTION" IS UNDERSTOOD AS AN ONGOING PROCESS

"Consumption" is, in fact, commonly understood to mean more than the mere
introduction of a substance into a body. As observed by defendant, "consumption" is
defined as "'a consuming or being consumed,'" Aplt. Brf. at 14 (quoting Webster's New
World College Dictionary 313 (4th ed. 1999)) (emphasis added). "Consumption" is also
understood as "the act or action of consuming" or "the using up . . . of something."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 490 (1993) (emphasis added). Defendant also notes
that "consume" is defined as "'[t]he act of destroying a thing by using it'" or "'the use of a
thing in a way that thereby exhausts it'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 254 (abridged 7
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ed. 2000)) (emphases added). "Consume" is likewise understood to mean "to use up;
expend" or "to waste or burn away." Webster's Int'l at 490 (emphases added).
The foregoing definitions do not suggest "an act that is taking place at the moment a
substance is being introduced into [a] body," as defendant claims. Aplt. Brf. at 14. To the
contrary, they denote a progressive action, as "the consumption of organic matter by fire," or
as an "iron furnace consume[s] thousands of chords for fuel." Webster's Int'l at 490
(emphasis in original). The process of consumption only begins when a drug is introduced
into the body. An automobile's consumption of gasoline does not end when the tank is filled
with gas, but continues as the engine bums, "use[s] up," or "expend[s]" the fuel. See
Webster's Int'l at 490. Likewise, the consumption or use of a controlled substance does not
end when the substance is introduced into the body. That is only the beginning of its use.
Consumption occurs as the body expends or metabolizes the substance. Indeed, it is only
during this use that the user derives the effects of the drug, just as an engine consumes fuel.
The State acknowledges that "consume" or "consumption" can refer simply to eating
or denote the "immediate destruction" of a thing. Webster's Int'l at 490. However, as
explained above, giving it such a meaning under the statute renders it, or the words
surrounding it, "'superfluous, void or insignificant.'" Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^f 52 (quoting
Norman J. Singer at § 46:06).
D.

T H E CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT ARE INAPPOSITE

In support of his claim that "consumption" denotes only the introduction of a
substance into the body, defendant cites to three decisions from other jurisdictions: State v.
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Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1993); State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986); and
State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. App. 1989). See Aplt. Brf. at 16-20. None of
these cases are helpful.
In Flinchpaugh, the Kansas Supreme Court held that "[o]nce a controlled substance is
within a person's system, the power to control, possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at
an end." Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 at 211. The Kansas court explained that "[t]he ability to
control the drug is beyond human capabilities," and therefore, "[t]he essential element of
control is absent." Id. (emphasis added). The court thus concluded that "[e]vidence of a
controlled substance after it is assimilated in a person's blood does not establish possession
or control of that substance." Id. (emphasis added).
Flinchpaugh is not helpful because unlike Utah's statute, the Kansas statute does not
prohibit the "use" of a controlled substance. Cf. State v. Sorensen, 2003 UT App 292
(unpub. mem. dec.) (observing that section 58-37-2(l)(dd) "defining possession of controlled
substances clearly includes 'inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption'"). The
Kansas statute in question makes it unlawful "'to manufacture, possess, have under [ ]
control, possess with intent to sell, sell, prescribe, administer, deliver, distribute, dispense or
compound'" controlled substances. Id. (quoting K.S.A. 65-4127a). The statute thus focuses
on the unlawful "possession" of drugs, an essential element of which is dominion or control.
In Hornaday, the Washington Supreme Court relies on Flinchpaugh in likewise
concluding that a person could not be in "possession" of any liquor once the person has
drank the beverage. The court explained that once a person drinks the alcohol, it is "no
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longer in [the person's] control and/or possession." Hornaday, 713 P.2d at 75 (citing
Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 208). As explained, however, the issue here is not whether
defendant possessed the methamphetamine, but whether he was using the methamphetamine.
Like Utah's statute, however, the Washington statute also makes it unlawful to
"consume" the prohibited substance. Id. at 73 (quoting RCW 66.44.270). But unlike Utah's
statute, the Washington statute provides a definition of "consume" that specifically limits its
meaning to the initial act of consumption, defining it as '"fat putting of liquor to any use,
whether by drinking or otherwise.'" Id. at 76 (quoting RCW 66.04.010(6)) (emphasis
added). Use of the verb "put" denotes the initiation of drinking. See Webster's Int'l at 1849
(defining "put" as "to cause to perform an action" or "to set to use"). Utah's statute has not
limited the meaning of "consumption" by so defining it.
Finally, in Abu-Shanab, the Minnesota Court of Appeals relied on Hornaday in
concluding that "'consume,' in the context of alcoholic beverages, means to drink, and that
once drunk, alcohol is no longer being consumed." Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d at 559. As
with Utah's drug statute, "consume" is not defined under Minnesota's law. However, unlike
Utah's drug statute, the Minnesota alcohol statute does not employ other terms that would
render meaningless and insignificant the term "consume," as narrowly defined. See Minn.
Stat. § 340A.503 (1988) (making it unlawful for a "person under the age of 21 years to
consume any alcoholic beverages . .. "). Accordingly, Abu-Shanab is of no relevance in
defining consumption under Utah's drug statute.
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Nor is this Court's decision in State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988),
controlling or otherwise applicable. In Sorenson, "the state conceded that it could not prove
that the offense of consumption was committed in Utah" by virtue of an odor of alcohol on
the defendant's breath. Id. at 469. Therefore, the State treated consumption as being limited
to the introduction of alcohol into the body by drinking. The definition of "consumption"
was thus not at issue. Given that context, the Court held that the odor of alcohol on
someone's breath was not sufficient, in itself, to establish that the defendant drank the
alcohol in Utah for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. Id. at 468-70. Sorenson is also
distinguishable in that no blood or breath test was performed to establish that alcohol was in
fact in defendant's body and that he was thus still "consuming" it.3
* * *

Because "consumption" is understood as a progressive process of using up, burning,
or expending a substance, and because narrowing its meaning to the initial introduction of a
controlled substance into the body would render the term, or the terms surrounding it,
meaningless and insignificant, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding of

3

Defendant has also claimed that interpreting "consumption" as including the
physiological metabolism of a controlled substance "potentially gives rise to other
constitutional concerns by making 'status' criminals of narcotics addicts who would be
'continuously guilty of [possession or use of a controlled substance, whether or not he as
ever used or possessed any narcotics within the State.'" Aplt. Brf at 21 (quoting Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 762-63, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 1420 (I960)). The Court should not
address this claim because defendant did not raise it below, see R. 248: 115-22, and has not
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. State v.
Hodges, 2002 UT 117, If 5, 63 P.3d 66 (refusing to address defendant's unpreserved
constitutional claim because defendant had asserted neither exception on appeal).
12

jurisdiction. Because this case is a "use" case, Hornaday's dissent has even greater force:
"To hold that an admittedly intoxicated person is not in possession of intoxicants," or in this
case, that he is not using intoxicants, "is an exercise in sophistry beyond . . . comprehension
unless we, like spiders, are content to spin fine but temporary webs." Hornaday, 713 P.2d at
78 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted April 15, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

iY S. GRAY
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

Addendum A

Fll£0
Thi,

Kelt
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

PRETRIAL RULING ON JURISDICTION

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 021902023 FS

JEFFREY DON IRELAND,

Judge McCleve

Defendant.
Pursuant to Utah Code §§ 76-1-201, -202, -501(3) (2002) and State and Graham v.
Payne, 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995), plaintiff State of Utah has requested a pretrial ruling on
jurisdiction over Count I of the information, charging defendant with unlawful possession or use
of methamphetamine, a third degree felony.
The parties do not dispute the pertinent facts: On or about November 3-4, 2001,
defendant was arrested in Salt Lake County, Utah., following his alleged involvement in an
automobile accident that occurred in Salt Lake County. Pursuant to a warrant, a sample of his
blood was collected. That blood sample, the State alleges, tested positive for a measureable
amount of methamphetamine. Beyond defendant's presence in Utah at that time, the State has no
certain proof of the location where defendant ingested the drug.

i.o^

RULING ON JURISDICTION
State vs Ireland
(Ireland Junsd Ruling) PAGE 2

In accord with the authority cited by the State, this Court finds that it has jurisdiction over
Count I , because it was "committed either wholly or partly within the state." This is so because
"possession or use" is broadly defined in the charging statute, to include "ownership, control,
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing,
injection, or consumption" of controlled substances. Utah Code § 58-37-2(l)(dd) (2002). In
order to establish jurisdiction, the State need not prove where defendant ingested the
methamphetamine. Instead, this Court is satisfied that "consumption" includes defendant's
physiological metabolism of the substance, which was an ongoing process. That process
occurred at least partly within Utah. Therefore, this Court has jurisdi^ti^^g^Qount I.
SO ORDERED this

/ ' f - d a y of September, 2002.

{f^f

< ^ ^ ^ C \ ^ \

,>

SHEILA K. M f c
District Court Jue
Approved as to form:

Attorney tor Defendai

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Pretrial Ruling on Jurisdiction was
delivered to LISA REMAL of SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N, attorneys for
defendant, and to KEVIN MURPHY of SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
attorneys for plaintiff, this

day of September, 2002.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & ORDER DENYING MOT. TO SUPPRESS
State vs. Ireland
(Ireland Suppr FFCL) PAGE 5

ORDER
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, defendant's motion to
suppress is denied. SO ORDERED this / *r day of Sepjprffber, 20(

SHEILA K. McCLEVE
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Attorney f^rdefendant

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order were delivered to LISA REMAL of SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N,
attorneys for defendant, and to KEVIN MURPHY of SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, attorneys for plaintiff, this

day of September, 2002.

Addendum B

Addendum B

FILED

h

Utah Court of Appeals

AUG 2 8 2003
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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BENCH, Judge:
At a preliminary hearing, bind-over is appropriate if the
prosecution presents evidence establishing "probable cause to
believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it," Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) (2); see also
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,^16, 20 P.3d 300 (eliminating the
distinction between the probable cause required for an arrest
warrant and the probable cause necessary to bind over). The
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of
the prosecution. See id. at UlO. The evidence produced at a
preliminary hearing "need not be capable of supporting a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at f15. Whether
probable cause exists to bind over a defendant for trial is a
question of law, reviewed on appeal "without deference to the
court below." State v. Schrover, 2002 UT 26,^8, 44 P.3d 730.
Although Defendant Sorensen was not in actual, physical
possession of the paraphernalia and methamphetamine residue found
in his house on August 8, the prosecution alleges that he
constructively possessed both. The evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing demonstrates probable c ause to believe that
Sorensen had "the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and

control" over the paraphernalia and methamphetamine residue.
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). For example, an
officer testified that Sorensen's ex-wife stated that the bedroom
where the contraband was found belonged to Sorensen and that "he
had spent the [previous] night there."1 Further, Sorensen's day
planner, social security card, and other papers bearing his name
were found in the bedroom. When viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, with all reasonable inferences
being drawn in its favor, the evidence establishes the requisite
"nexus" between Sorensen and the contraband to establish probable
cause to have him bound over for trial. Id.
As for the charges resulting from the events of August 20, a
positive urine analysis alone, without corroborating evidence, is
sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Sorensen
possessed methamphetamine and morphine.2 Cf. State v. Sorenson,
758 P.2d 466, 468 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing decisions
from other jurisdictions where the presence of alcohol or
controlled substance in a person's urine did not establish
possession beyond a reasonable doubt). Utah's statute defining
possession of controlled substances clearly includes "inhalation,
swallowing, injection, or consumption." Utah Code Ann. § 58-372(1) (dd) (2002) .
In response, Sorensen claims that he cannot be charged with
both possession of methamphetamine and possession of
paraphernalia because the methamphetamine charge stems from the
presence of residue on the items the prosecution claims are
paraphernalia. However, the items could be considered
paraphernalia even without the residue because presence of
residue is a factor, rather than a requirement, used in
determining whether an item is paraphernalia. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37a-4(5) (2002). Therefore, the residue can form the basis
for the methamphetamine charge, independent of the paraphernalia
1. In his appellate brief, Sorensen argues that his ex-wife's
statements should not have been considered at the preliminary
hearing because the statements are unreliable and only reliable
hearsay is admissible at preliminary hearings. However, Sorensen
failed to object to the admissibility of the statements, and
issues not raised in the court below "cannot be argued for the
first time on appeal" unless "exceptional circumstances" exist or
"plain error" occurred. State v. Arauelles, 2003 UT 1,1141, 63
P.3d 731. Sorensen has argued neither "exceptional
circumstances" nor "plain error." Id.
2. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of
establishing, at trial, that the presence of morphine was
attributable to Sorensen's valid prescription for Lortab.
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charge. Finally, Sorensen's reliance on Spanish Fork City v.
Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 501, is misplaced because Bryan
addressed the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rather
than probable cause.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case for further
proceedings.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

I CONCUR:
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